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SELF-HANDICAPPING AND MANAGERS’ DUTY OF
CARE
David A. Hoffman*

This Symposium Essay focuses on the relationship between
managers’ duty of care and self-handicapping, or constructing
obstacles to performance with the goal of influencing subsequent
explanations about outcomes.
Conventional explanations for
failures of caretaking by managers have focused on motives (greed)
and incentives (agency costs). These accounts of manager behavior
have led some modern jurists, concerned about recent corporate
scandals, to advocate for stronger deterrent measures to realign
manager and shareholder incentives.
Self-handicapping theory, by contrast, teaches that bad
manager behavior may occur even when incentives are well aligned.
Highly successful individuals in particular come to fear the pressure
of replicating past success. To avoid the regret associated with the
future failure that they anticipate, such individuals then create
hurdles (through active or passive self-sabotage) or excuses. When
failure comes, individuals hope to shift attention from their personal
merits to the handicap. Research shows that self-handicapping
“works.” Indeed, managers in failing firms who self-handicap may
escape with their reputations and compensation burnished.
In this Essay, I summarize an extensive body of research on
self-handicapping that surprisingly has not been well explored by
corporate law theorists. I then suggest that modern corporate
scandals traditionally understood as products of failures of
monitoring—like Enron—might be better explained, in part, as a
function of self-handicapping by managers. This explanation
supports recent efforts to move beyond a purely carrot-and-stick
model of corporate governance.
Finally, I briefly discuss
mechanisms to reduce self-handicapping by corporate officers; in
particular, making them self-aware and selecting executives less
prone to engage in this type of wasteful activity. The law has a
potential role to play in this process, but its proper focus is directors’
* Associate Professor of Law, Temple University’s Beasley School of Law.
J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Yale College. Jane Baron, Craig Green, Peter
Huang, Jonathan Lipson, Salil Mehra, and participants at the Wake Forest
Law Review 2007 Business Law Symposium provided helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this Essay. I thank Julie George, Marcie Seiler, and Jill Thomas
for research assistance.

803

W07-HOFFMAN

804

9/17/2007 1:48:37 PM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

negligence in hiring, not managers’ failures in taking business risks.
Authors commonly introduce their works in symposium issues
with a few disclaiming words. They identify their scholarship as a
“Symposium Essay,” not an “Article”; a “sketch” of an answer, not a
fully fleshed out argument. Casual readers might conclude that law
professors are unusually humble and resist trumpeting the novelty
1
and sophistication of their scholarship.
Social psychologists might instead believe that symposium
authors seek to avoid reputational sanctions for publicizing
2
arguments they have not fully worked out. Scholars try to signal
an excuse for underdeveloped pieces: “I haven’t worked as hard on
this paper as I would have if it were a ‘real’ article.” The goal of this
excuse making is simple: disappointed readers will attribute blame
away from the author’s perceived acuity and professional
reputation.
This is a Symposium Essay about the psychology of creating
such pre-excuses for failure. Rather than focus on academics, I will
3
My
examine the failings of overconfident corporate managers.
primary goal is to introduce legal readers to a well-known
4
phenomenon from social psychology literature: self-handicapping. I
will illustrate this behavioral bias by taking a close look at the
fiduciary duty of care applicable to corporate managers under state
5
As I will show, the prevalence of self-handicapping
law.
1. But cf. David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 1395 (2006) (providing a general theory of exaggerated sales talk).
2. See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character:
A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 98–99
(2004) (arguing that people tend to create “situational factors” on which to
blame potential failures when they are unsure of success).
3. By “managers” I mean officers—those who run the day-to-day
operations of the business. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling
Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1621–22
(2005) (explaining the distinctions between managers, officers, and directors).
4. Self-handicapping has rarely been explored in law reviews, with only
twenty-two citations to the term in the Westlaw’s Journals database (JLR).
Most work treats the phenomenon with respect to academic performance. See,
e.g., Barbara Glesner Fines, Competition and the Curve, 65 UMKC L. REV. 879,
900 (1997) (explaining bad course selection as a self-handicapping mechanism);
Denise Riebe, A Bar Review for Law Schools: Getting Students on Board to Pass
Their Bar Exams, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 269, 337–38 (2007) (discussing student use
of self-handicapping to compensate for expected poor grades). Others have
discussed self-handicapping as a more general situational characteristic. See,
e.g., Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 2, at 98–99. Only one paper, by George
Triantis, considers self-handicapping in the corporate context. George G.
Triantis, Debt Financing and Motivation, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1323 (1997). I
discuss that paper infra at note 56.
5. I pass over the implications of Sarbanes-Oxley, realizing that the Act
(a) creates important federal duties for senior managers and (b) exerts
gravitational force on state law, pulling it toward a regime of greater manager
accountability. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
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complicates efforts to properly motivate managers to exercise
optimal care.
I begin by summarizing two familiar puzzles facing theorists of
the duty of care. In Part I of this Essay, I will explore these puzzles
in greater detail.
First, violations of the caretaking duty rarely produce monetary
6
Shareholders
damages against corporate directors or officers.
possess a right to careful corporate stewards, but defenses like the
business judgment rule (“BJR”), exculpation, and indemnification
7
make the right’s remedy nearly illusory. Despite this illusory care
8
regime, most directors and officers are careful most of the time.
This seeming paradox creates a familiar problem and a flowering of
behavioral, legal, and sociological literatures explaining the
9
presence and degree of care in the absence of sanctions.
Second, corporate fiduciary duties, like the duty of care, are
almost never conceived of as applying simply to managers (as
10
opposed to directors). So rarely have managers faced liability that
it is unclear, at this late date, what substantive standards of care
11
they face, at least under the default rules of Delaware law. Why
U.S.C.).
6. See infra notes 24–29 and accompanying text.
7. Over time, the duty of care’s toothless maw has disgorged a bestiary of
analogies. See Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New
Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J.
1078, 1095 (1967) (noting that liability for care would result in “the proverbial
shaving of pigs—much squeal and little wool”); Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper
Motives of Corporate Directors (or, Why You Don’t Want to Invite Homo
Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 7 (2003) (noting that a
“director is statistically more likely to be attacked by killer bees than she is to
have to ever pay damages for breach of the duty of care”).
8. Stout, supra note 7, at 8.
9. See infra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.
10. Exceptions include Z. Jill Barclift, Senior Corporate Officers and the
Duty of Candor: Do the CEO and CFO Have a Duty to Inform?, 41 VAL. U. L.
REV. 269, 282 (2006) (arguing for an affirmative duty owed by senior officers to
directors to inform them of material facts); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A.
Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A
Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865, 870–75 (2005) (asserting that the
BJR applies to officers); Dennis R. Honabach, Smith v. Van Gorkom:
Managerial Liability and Exculpatory Clauses—A Proposal to Fill the Gap of
the Missing Officer Protection, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 307, 324–41 (2006) (proposing
the expansion of exculpation for officers); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate
Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 440 (2005) (arguing
the BJR “does not and should not be extended to corporate officers”); Johnson &
Millon, supra note 3 (discussing the various fiduciary duties of officers); Cheryl
L. Wade, Corporate Governance Failures and the Managerial Duty of Care, 76
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 767, 770 (2002) (“Much has been written about the directorial
duty of care, including analyses that distinguish standards applicable to inside
and outside directors. Much less has been written about the managerial duty of
care.”).
11. See, e.g., Johnson & Millon, supra note 3, at 1631–35 (noting areas of
uncertainty). This uncertainty is less evident outside of the common law arena.

W07-HOFFMAN

806

9/17/2007 1:48:37 PM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

has such uncertainty persisted as a structural component of
corporate jurisprudence, which usually values predictable outcomes
12
As importantly, assuming that the duty of care
to litigation?
applies differently to managers than to directors, will managers
take care in response to potential legal sanctions?
Self-handicapping provides a new way of thinking about these
long-standing puzzles. It explains the “immunity” stance of the care
doctrine: more legal sanctions may perversely increase negligence,
not decrease it. It also suggests reasons to believe that managers’
reactions to increased liability regimes are likely to be
unpredictable, and therefore cautions against drastic changes in the
current legal framework. Uncertainty may be more powerful
medicine for laziness than clarity.
Self-handicapping behaviors are “impediments to performance
that people construct to protect or enhance their perceived
13
competence.” Individuals create such hurdles at specific moments:
when they have succeeded in the past but do not know precisely how
or why, and when they are confronted with a future task with
14
implications for their egos. Under such circumstances, individuals
sometimes seek excuses—either claimed or behavioral—that will
deflect future attributions of blame (or success) away from
15
themselves.
Corporate jurists should be interested in self-handicapping
because the research challenges a dominant assumption that the
law can effectively calibrate its deterrent effects on calculating
16
managers and directors. Recent literature has modified this story,

The Model Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”) has standards of manager
conduct that are akin to those for directors, as does the American Law Institute
(“ALI”). See Barclift, supra note 10, at 279–80. Similarly, many officers’ duties
are mandated by their employment contracts. See Johnson & Millon, supra, at
1635 (noting the variations of duties for different officers).
12. See Honabach, supra note 10, at 307, 330–32 (noting the costs of
uncertainty and suggesting that the uncertainty is a historic artifact of a time
where officer lawsuits were rare).
13. Miron Zuckerman & Fen-Fang Tsai, Costs of Self-Handicapping, 73 J.
PERSONALITY 411, 411 (2005).
14. For a general model of the relationship between ego and individual
welfare, see Botond Köszegi, Ego Utility, Overconfidence, and Task Choice, 4 J.
EUR. ECON. ASS’N 673 (2006).
15. The degree to which self-handicapping occurs obviously depends on the
individual: none of the experiments discussed below observed self-handicapping
in one hundred percent of subjects who were expected to self-handicap. This
problem is common in experimental psychology and cautions against aggressive
interventions that might distort the behavior of otherwise rational actors. See
Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J.
67, 83–119 (2002) (discussing the relationship between heterogeneous
populations of experimental subjects and paternalism in behavioral law and
economics).
16. See, e.g., Michael Kent Block et al., The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust
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17

focusing on a culture of integrity, or the pressures of a corporate
18
system in extremis, but the basic story of caretaking (as opposed to
loyalty) has remained the same: lazy managers are either
19
insufficiently motivated or scared. In Part II of this Essay, I will
describe contrary self-handicapping explanations for negligence,
focusing on several benchmark studies of interest.
In Part III, I will connect these two literatures and suggest
ways that self-handicapping helps to explain the current stance of
Delaware courts toward managers’ duty of care. I suggest that a
psychologically realistic model of how executive negligence arises
would be skeptical of a strong liability regime. Finally, to the extent
that law cannot fully deter misbehavior, I detail how corporations
and jurists might work to ameliorate self-handicapping by
managers.
I.

MANAGERS’ DUTY OF CARE

As the organizers of this symposium have recognized, the duties
of corporate managers have been long eclipsed in the law reviews
20
and courts by those of their director overseers. The law’s curious

Enforcement, 89 J. POL. ECON. 429, 438–39 (1981) (finding that enforcement by
the Department of Justice reduced price-fixing in the bread industry); John
Braithwaite & Gilbert Geis, On Theory and Action for Corporate Crime Control,
28 CRIME & DELINQ. 292, 302 (1982) (arguing that “[c]orporate crimes are
almost never crimes of passion; they are not spontaneous or emotional, but
calculated risks taken by rational actors.”); Raymond Paternoster & Sally
Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice
Model of Corporate Crime, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 549, 571 (1996) (concluding that
respondents were less likely to express an intention to act criminally if they
perceived a punishment aimed at them); Sally S. Simpson & Christopher S.
Koper, Deterring Corporate Crime, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 347, 360 n.23 (1992)
(finding that firms convicted of antitrust violations reduced their future
misconduct); Edward A. Snyder, The Effect of Higher Criminal Penalties on
Antitrust Enforcement, 33 J.L. & ECON. 439, 449–50 (1990) (finding that the
number of price-fixing cases fell following the elevation of sanction level).
17. Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 16, at 568.
But see John
Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate
Deterrence, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 7, 32 (1991) (finding that nursing home
directors’ moral beliefs in following standards did not significantly deter them
from noncompliance). See generally Michael C. Jensen, Putting Integrity into
Finance Theory and Practice: A Positive Approach (Harvard NOM, Working
Paper No. 06-06, 2006, Revised June 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=876312 (discussing integrity in the corporate context).
18. Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 16, at 568–69; Sally S. Simpson,
The Decomposition of Antitrust: Testing a Multi-Level, Longitudinal Model of
Profit-Squeeze, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 859, 867–68 (1986).
19. See Pasternoster & Simpson, supra note 16.
20. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. The director literature is
itself rich, with varied views on how best to control director misconduct in light
of psychological insights. See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the
Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92
IOWA L. REV. 105, 152–57 (2006) (suggesting a personal liability regime for
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stance toward director liability—a strong fiduciary regime in theory,
but an absence of real liability on the ground—has been fodder for
21
arguments about the proper master of the board: the market or the
22
courts. The rationales for focusing on the duties of directors are
many, but reduce to control: directors retain the ultimate “legal
trump card” to fire managers; therefore, the law should monitor
23
directors, not their servants.
24
A
This exclusive focus on directors’ incentives is costly.
suspicion of money damages for breaches of fiduciary duties arises
(at least historically) from a worry about chilling entrepreneurship.
As Chancellor Allen justified the BJR:
[Directors] enjoy (as residual owners) only a very small
proportion of any “upside” gains earned by the corporation on
risky investment projects. If . . . [they] were to be found liable
for a corporate loss from a risky project . . . their liability
would be joint and several . . . . Given the scale of operation of
modern public corporations, this stupefying disjunction
between risk and reward for corporate directors threatens
undesirable effects. [O]nly a very small probability of director
liability based on “negligence”, “inattention”, “waste”, etc.,
could induce a board to avoid authorizing risky investment
25
projects to any extent!

This view that directors reap insufficient gains from corporate
operations to justify the losses of litigation based on negligent
26
But even so, the financial
stewardship is possibly obsolete.
incentives of directors are quite different from those of managers:
the deficient-rewards theory seems particularly inapt when applied
directors calibrated to their net worth).
21. A related question, of course, is whether the board or the shareholders
are properly the master of the corporation. For a heterodox view, see Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 563–74 (2003).
22. Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of
Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 94–104, 118
(noting that the stringent monitoring regimes imposed by law may reduce
intercorporate trust and values, and recommending against putting too much
weight on a compliance system in evaluating legal wrongdoing).
23. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 105 (2004). Johnson and Millon challenge the
legal control model as descriptively inaccurate: officers usually have power over
directors by virtue of their knowledge, tenure, and the CEO’s position as
Chairman of the Board. Johnson & Millon, supra note 3, at 1617–20.
24. See generally Johnson & Millon, supra note 3, at 1605–27 (discussing
corporate officer roles).
25. Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
26. Richard H. Wagner & Catherine G. Wagner, Recent Developments in
Executive, Director, and Employee Stock Compensation Plans: New Concerns for
Corporate Directors, 3 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 5, 8–9 (1997) (describing the
increasing practice of giving directors stock awards or stock options as part of
their compensation packages).
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to managers who take large amounts of stock in the corporation as a
27
form of compensation.
For such individuals, the rewards for
business risk taking are potentially quite rich, and the potential
losses in litigation remote and hard to foresee. To the extent that
managers are protected by the BJR and exculpation—and it is
28
unclear if they are—jurists must search for new rationales.
Nevertheless, corporate scholars routinely lump together the duties
29
of managers and directors without further analysis.
There is a new and developing series of papers that do consider
the duties and motivations of managers standing alone. Oddly,
most scholars in this managerial project concern themselves almost
30
exclusively on the duty of loyalty. However, because this literature
also sheds light on managers’ duty of care, I will briefly take a
diversion to explain its main findings and conclusions.
The rational choice model explains disloyalty as an agency cost:
managers lack incentives and sanctions that align their incentives
31
Loyalty is a more serious problem than
with the shareholders.
care, in this view, because it retards full disclosure and resulting
market discipline. Thus, the law punishes disloyalty by managers
severely, denying such conduct the protection of the business
32
judgment rule or exculpation.
By contrast, a recent strand of literature suggests that
27. See Bainbridge, supra note 23, at 117 (noting that outside directors are
sometimes required to buy stock to help align incentives); Johnson, supra note
10, at 458–59 (arguing that stock makes up a large portion of officer
compensation). But see Honabach, supra note 10, at 333–34 (arguing that the
expected liability costs of modern corporate litigations would be beyond the
means of most managers).
28. See Hamermesh & Sparks, supra note 10, at 874–75 (arguing that
liability for managers would result in passing hard decisions to the board);
Honabach, supra note 10, at 324–41 (noting that only seven states provide
exculpation for managers, and suggesting several grounds for expanding
manager immunity, including diversification).
29. See, e.g., ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.4 (1986) (describing the
duty of care as applying to “directors and officers,” but focusing discussion on
the motives of directors); JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS
800 (2d ed. 2003) (stating in the index: “Officers and Agents, fiduciary duties of.
See Directors”); J. Gordon Christy, Corporate Mismanagement as Malpractice: A
Critical Reanalysis of Corporate Managers’ Duties of Care and Loyalty, 21
HOUS. L. REV. 105, 105 n.1. (1984) (“As used herein, the terms ‘managers’ and
‘management’ refer to inside directors and senior executive officers who dictate
corporate policy.”).
30. Why this should be is itself puzzling. Negligence, not disloyalty, would
seem to be the more common agency cost created by managers. See, e.g.,
Christy, supra note 29, at 107–08 (summarizing the then state-of-the-art
literature on management negligence).
31. See Pasternoster & Simpson, supra note 16, at 550–51 (summarizing
literature on the rational choice model).
32. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
180 (Del. 1986) (shifting the burden to the board given allegations of selfdealing).
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managerial disloyalty is a structural component of how corporations
33
select executives.
Professor Donald Langevoort, for example,
illustrates how executives’ disloyal psychological character is a
product of a tournament of selection that they must win to rise in
34
the corporate pyramid. Executives attain their position by taking
risks at successive iterations of a game in which the “finalists will be
those risk-takers lucky enough to have avoided the predictable
35
The tournament
failures” that accompany business endeavors.
36
Similarly, because
inevitably produces overconfident managers.
“conscience is likely to be a burden in a fast-paced, competitive
setting,” managers winning tournaments will be “ethical[ly]
37
plastic[]” and Machiavellian.
The implication of this behavioral perspective is that the
amount of manager disloyalty is not only related to the extant
deterrence regime, but also the CEO’s insecurity. Langevoort
predicts more dishonesty as the CEO perceives higher levels of
38
threat to her incumbency by the board. She will “rationalize” bad
news, “deflect responsibility,” and withhold information from the
39
Such responses suggest that audit
board as bad results accrue.
controls (and the law generally) ought to be cognizant of CEOs’
increasing propensity to deceive as the pressure on their
40
incumbency increases.
As I have suggested, this new managerial loyalty literature
sheds light on managers’ duty of care. Take, for example, new
accounts explaining Enron’s fall (in part) as a result of managerial
41
negligence: a “singular ineptness below the level of the board.”
That ineptness arose from (among other things) an unwillingness to
33. See Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons
from the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and
the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285 (2004).
34. Id. at 299 (introducing the idea of the tournament of selection).
35. Id. at 300. For other work developing this tournament model, see Troy
A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance,
CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 684–85 n.41
(2005) (summarizing the literature).
36. Langevoort, supra note 33, at 301.
37. Id. at 303.
38. Id. at 304–08; see also Kath Hall, The Psychology of Corporate
Dishonesty, 19 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 268 (2006) (discussing the various reasons for
corporate dishonesty, including self-image, avoidance of “ego-threatening
information,” and commitment to prior decisions). Hall attributes a prominent
Australian corporate scandal to executives’ desire to blame a deteriorating
financial position on external events; screening out of contrary, ego-threatening,
information; and strategic over-persistence. Id. at 272–74 (discussing HIH
Insurance scandal).
39. Langevoort, supra note 33, at 307–08.
40. Id. at 316–17; see also Hall, supra note 38, at 286 (suggesting that the
law has to understand dishonesty to properly regulate it).
41. Deborah A. DeMott, Inside the Corporate Veil: The Character and
Consequences of Executives’ Duties, 19 AUSTL. J. CORP. LAW 251, 254 (2006).
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work on the “workaday, boring details.”
In response to this
negligence, Professor Deborah DeMott suggests a renewed
commitment to a duty of care for managers: the law should
“mandat[e] that an executive exercise care and diligence[]” and
encourage officers to separate themselves from an organizational
43
culture of slackness. This work parallels the rational choice theory
of managers’ duty of loyalty.
By contrast, Professor Troy Paredes has applied Langevoort’s
44
tournament model to managerial caretaking. Overconfidence leads
managers to “take excessive risks . . . even when they are acting in
45
good faith and trying to maximize shareholder value.” Later, when
such projects begin to fail, managers double down their bad bets,
46
“creating distortions and inefficiencies,” if not “outright fraud.”
Paredes attributes overconfidence, in part, to the “atmosphere of
47
deference” surrounding CEOs. He recommends that courts “take a
tougher stance when enforcing fiduciary obligations under the duty
48
of care.” This tougher stance would amount to scrutiny of decision
49
making to look for debiasing by the board of CEO overconfidence.
Such different perspectives on managers’ duties have a common
theme: the problem of care is largely external to CEOs, who are
simply maximizing their self-interest as they see it. As Langevoort
states, unlike directors, “CEO[s] [are] highly motivated” by equity
50
incentives, and that “power and status follow handsomely as well.”
Similarly, were the law to provide a better package of “sticks” that
governed managers’ care, there would be less shirking, more
attention to details, and better returns on shareholders’
51
investments. On this account, managerial negligence is potentially
52
remediable through familiar devices: allocations of stock, targeted
53
54
55
insurance and legal fees, social norms, and legal sanctions.
42. Id. at 255 (internal quotation omitted).
43. Id. at 266; see also Johnson & Millon, supra note 3, at 1639–42
(suggesting that conceiving of managers as agents will reinforce the duty of care
and lead to less negligence).
44. Paredes, supra note 35.
45. Id. at 688.
46. Id. at 689.
47. Id. at 721.
48. Id. at 749.
49. Id. at 749–51.
50. Langevoort, supra note 33, at 297.
51. See DeMott, supra note 41 (explaining the merits of below-the-board
duty of care); Johnson & Millon, supra note 3, at 1638–43 (noting the deterrence
benefits of a renewed set of manager fiduciary duties); Wade, supra note 10, at
785 (arguing that improved communication between officers and the board
would encourage monitoring and improve shareholder wealth).
52. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C. L. REV. 835, 836
(2004) (describing stock options as the “centerpiece of the vast majority of
executive compensation packages beginning in the early 1990s”).
53. See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime,
Advancement of Executives’ Defense Costs, and the Federal Courts, 7 U.C. DAVIS
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Thus, scholars believe that the law has a motivational role:
encouraging executives toward diligence by tying their egos closer to
56
the corporation’s success.
II.

SELF-HANDICAPPING: A LITERATURE REVIEW

This section explores the idea that managers may fail to take
care for reasons that are unrelated to the proper setting of
incentives and sanctions by law. Shirking by managers does not
occur simply because managers have too little at stake in the
corporate enterprise, but in some circumstances because they are too
involved with the corporation’s success.
That is: manager
negligence may be a deliberate strategy to self-handicap. I make
this claim in two parts.
First, I describe the general selfhandicapping findings, its relationship to effort, and preliminary
work on reducing self-handicapping in experimental settings.
Second, I describe some very new work on corporate executive selfhandicapping and its relationship both to firm value and CEO
compensation.
A.

Self-Handicapping: A Literature Review

Modern work on self-handicapping started in 1978 with a pair
57
Their basic
of articles by Steven Berglas and Edward Jones.
BUS. L.J. 55 (2006) (commenting on the behavioral effects of advancement of
fees).
54. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law
Introduction, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001) (discussing how corporate norms
shape conduct).
55. See, e.g., Simpson & Koper, supra note 16 (analyzing the effects of legal
sanctions on corporate deterrence).
56. I borrow the idea of the psychologically motivational role of corporate
law from George Triantis’s excellent essay on corporate debt and its
relationship to the behavioral theory of learned helplessness. See Triantis,
supra note 4. Triantis observes that debt is usually thought of as an important
and immediate goad to care: “the consequences of missing a scheduled debt
repayment are typically far more grave than those that follow a reduction in
dividends or a decision not to repurchase stock.” Id. at 1327. However, the
motivating effects of debt or equity depend on the “self-efficacy” of the
individual manager: “a person’s judgment of her capabilities to organize and
execute courses of action required to achieve designated performance demands.”
Id. at 1334. As Triantis further concludes, managers may fall victim to learned
helplessness, which engenders self-handicapping. Id. at 1341.
57. Steven Berglas & Edward E. Jones, Drug Choice as a SelfHandicapping Strategy in Response to Noncontingent Success, 36 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 405 (1978) [hereinafter Berglas & Jones];
Edward E. Jones & Steven Berglas, Control of Attributions About the Self
Through Self-Handicapping Strategies: The Appeal of Alcohol and the Role of
Underachievement, 4 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 200 (1978)
[hereinafter Jones & Berglas]; see generally Phyllis A Siegel et al., Reducing the
Tendency to Self-Handicap: The Effect of Self-Affirmation, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 589, 589–90 (2005) (summarizing the literature). For a history
of self-handicapping that explores its roots in the clinical and social psychology
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experimental framework is now canonical. Subjects volunteering to
participate in an experiment were told that taking one of two drugs
halfway through a two-round IQ test would markedly change their
58
One drug, Actavil, would supposedly “facilitate
performance.
intellectual performance”; the other, Pandocrin, “was expected to
59
inhibit or disrupt intellectual performance.” Finally, subjects were
told that the IQ test was hard and that they should not expect to do
particularly well. In reality, the drugs were placebos, and the test
only had one manipulated round, mixing impossibly hard and
60
merely difficult questions.
The experimenters divided the subjects into two groups, later
labeled (1) the noncontingent success condition and (2) the
61
contingent success condition. They gave the noncontingent success
subjects an impossibly hard test, but gave the contingent success
62
subjects questions tailored to their ability. All subjects were told
after completing the test that “Yours was one of the best scores seen
63
to date!” Thus, Group 1’s success was not contingent on their effort
and ability; Group 2, by contrast, might fairly believe that the test
64
measured their worth.
Berglas and Jones then gave subjects in both conditions the
choice of whether to take Actavil or Pandocrin before beginning the
65
next round. Subjects could take a variety of doses of the drug, or
none at all, “according to [their] own personal preference . . . [and] to
66
what [they found] most interesting.”
Overall, seventy percent of the men in the noncontingent
success group chose to take the Pandocrin drug, while only thirteen
percent of the men in the contingent success group did. For women,
the percentages were forty percent and twenty-six percent
67
(A later experiment suggested that the women
respectively.
attributed their success in both conditions to luck at higher rates

traditions, see Raymond L. Higgins, Self-Handicapping: Historical Roots and
Contemporary Branches, in SELF-HANDICAPPING: THE PARADOX THAT ISN’T 1
(Higgins et al., eds., 1990).
58. Berglas & Jones, supra note 57, at 408 (noting that subjects who were
drug abusers or unwilling to take drugs in an experimental setting were
excluded).
59. Id. (noting that subjects were told that the predicted effects were
uncertain).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. The experimenters ranked each question based on difficulty and gave
subjects easier or harder questions depending on how they did on the previous
one. Id.
63. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 409. Some subjects had their scores publicized; other subjects’
scores were hidden. Id.
66. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
67. Id. at 412.
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than the men.) Self-handicapping theorists have replicated such
69
drug experiments many times.
Why would individuals take a debilitating drug? Berglas and
Jones hypothesized that individuals in the noncontingent success
condition felt a lack of control over a potential failure with a high
ego impact. They sought to avert self-doubt by shifting blame to
outside factors (like the drug). Thus, Berglas and Jones defined selfhandicapping as “any action . . . that enhances the opportunity to
70
externalize (or excuse) failure and to internalize . . . success.”
Later theories tied self-handicapping to attribution theory,
which explains when and why others attribute blame to our
71
actions. Under that theory’s discounting principle, “failure under
72
extenuating circumstances is not taken as proof of incompetence.”
And under the augmentation principle, “success despite obstacles is
73
seen as evidence of especially high ability.” This suggests that the
audience for self-handicaps may not be internal, as Berglas and
Jones had suggested, but rather external. It also suggests that it is
the lack of control over outcomes, not the failure itself, which
74
Later experimental work supported these
individuals fear.
68. Id. at 416.
69. See, e.g., Frederick X. Gibbons & William P. Gaeddert, Focus of
Attention and Placebo Utility, 20 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 159 (1984);
Jalie A. Tucker, et al., Alcohol Consumption as a Self-Handicapping Strategy,
90 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 220 (1981) (finding that male subjects drank more
alcohol when they had no ability to practice to improve their performance in a
non-contingent success condition).
70. Berglas & Jones, supra note 57, at 406.
71. See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Questions During Trial: A
Window into Juror Thinking, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1927, 1957 n.63 (2006)
(“Attribution theory focuses on how people arrive at causal explanations for
events.”); Lesley Wexler, Limiting the Precautionary Principle: Weapons
Regulation in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 459, 508–
10 (2006) (“Attribution theory is a ‘general conception of the way people think
about and analyze cause-effect data.’”).
72. Roy F. Baumeister & Steven J. Scher, Self-Defeating Behavior Patterns
Among Normal Individuals: Review and Analysis of Common Self-Destructive
Tendencies, 104 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 8 (1988).
73. Id.
74. Thompson and Richardson, for example, administered a commonly-used
self-handicapping scale to experimental subjects. Ted Thompson & Anna
Richardson, Self-Handicapping Status, Claimed Self-Handicaps and Reduced
Practice Effort Following Success and Failure Feedback, 71 BRIT. J. EDUC.
PSYCHOL. 151 (2001).
They then divided individuals into groups and
ascertained how much behavioral self-handicapping (taking practice problems)
individuals with high and low self-handicapping traits engaged in. They found
that prior success did not significantly affect handicapping, but rather the lack
of a relationship between effort, prior success, and future success. Such a lack
of relationship led, in their research, to helplessness and less practice. Id. But
see Steven Berglas, Self-Handicapping Behavior and the Self-Defeating
Personality Disorder: Toward a Refined Clinical Perspective, in SELF-DEFEATING
BEHAVIORS: EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH, CLINICAL IMPRESSIONS, AND PRACTICAL
IMPLICATIONS 261, 269 (Rebecca C. Curtis ed., 1989) (suggesting that self-
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attributive intuitions.
In one experiment, male subjects were told that they were
participating in an experiment to determine if either of two drugs
(Actavil and Pandocrin, again) used to treat metabolic disorders
75
would have a measurable effect on performance on an IQ test. The
men were divided into contingent and noncontingent success groups
76
using Berglas and Jones’s method.
Experimenters then allowed subjects to take their drug of choice
in public (in front of the experimenter) or in private (when the
experimenter was out of the room and allegedly would not know
77
which drug the subject had taken). Subjects ingested either drug
78
at a variety of dosage levels, based on preference.
Overall, forty-two percent of subjects in the public drug-choice
condition chose the debilitating drug. But only seven percent of
79
That is,
subjects in the private drug-choice condition did so!
subjects exhibited self-handicapping only when others were
watching them (and presumably would have knowledge of their
80
excuse). This data suggests that the “presence of another person is
81
a necessary condition for self-handicapping behavior.” Thus, self82
handicapping is best seen as a “self-presentation strategy.”
Why? Conceivably, when we are watched, we are more likely to
want to create public excuses for our looming failures, but in the
privacy of our minds, excuses are less attractive.
A different strand of research focuses on factors correlated with

handicapping is marked by timing: “following a success and in anticipation of
threats to the esteem gains derived from success feedback,” and that selfhandicapping occurs “only in response to successes deemed noncontingent”
(citation omitted)).
75. Thomas A. Kolditz & Robert M. Arkin, An Impression Management
Interpretation of the Self-Handicapping Strategy, 43 J. PERSONALITY SOC.
PSYCHOL. 492, 495 (1982).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 497.
79. Id. at 499.
80. Id. at 500.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 501. In another experiment, psychologists asked female subjects
to work on an alleged IQ test. Gibbons & Gaeddert, supra note 69, at 164–69.
The women were provided with a drug that they were told hurt, had no effect
on, or helped memory. Experimenters assigned half the women to a cubicle
with a mirror that faced them, and half to a cubicle containing a mirror facing
away from them. The experimenters found no significant differences between
reported ability, number of problems attempted, or percent correct in any of the
different subsets of subjects. However, women who took the (allegedly)
performance-inhibiting drug and did not see themselves in the mirror believed
that the drug was more inhibiting than women who did see themselves in the
mirror. Conversely, when the drug they ingested was performance-enhancing,
such women disclaimed its effects more than subjects who were focused on their
emotional state by the mirror. Id.
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83

increased levels of handicapping. I will focus on two such inciting
variables: (1) insecurity and (2) beliefs about the innateness of
84
intelligence.
There is a relationship between self-handicapping and selfesteem. Obviously, individuals with no self-esteem will have little
85
incentive to self-handicap. Neither will individuals with a reflexive
86
Therefore, selfand strongly confident view of their abilities.
handicapping is greatest when individuals have an “uncertain self87
evaluation.” In one experiment designed to test this view, Robert
Harris and C.R. Snyder sorted subjects based on their reported selfesteem, told them that they were to take an important IQ test, and
88
Harris and
suggested that practice would improve their scores.
Snyder found that uncertain men practiced for the test less than
89
Such individuals reaped a
secure men and insecure women.
90
benefit—less anxiety—from their failure to practice.
Second, a belief in “smartness” itself increases the likelihood to
91
self-handicap. Some individuals believe that intelligence itself is a
92
In a
fixed commodity; others believe that it is fairly malleable.
recent study, subjects were divided into groups based on their theory
93
of intelligence. They were then asked how willing they would be to
83. See generally Elizabeth A. Self, Situational Influences on SelfHandicapping, in SELF-HANDICAPPING, supra note 57, at 37, 38–53 (describing
eliciting factors of self-handicapping).
84. A third important inciting characteristic is gender. Research has
consistently shown that men behaviorally self-handicap at higher rates than
women, while women engage in claimed handicapping more than men.
Zuckerman & Tsai, supra note 13, at 432 (reviewing literature but not finding
the effect in a particular experiment). The mechanism of this distinction is
unclear, although recent research has theorized that men are working to protect
their higher perceived status by creating excuses for failure. See Jeffrey W.
Lucas & Michael J. Lovaglia, Self-Handicapping: Gender, Race, and Status, 10
CURRENT RES. SOC. PSYCHOL. (2005), available at http://www.uiowa.edu/
~grpproc/ crisp/crisp.10.16.html (finding that Caucasian men self-handicap at
greater rates than women and minorities).
85. Berglas & Jones, supra note 57, at 406.
86. Robert N. Harris & C. R. Snyder, The Role of Uncertain Self-Esteem in
Self-Handicapping, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 451, 451 (1986).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 452–53.
89. Id. at 456.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, The Talent Myth, NEW YORKER, July 22,
2002, at 28 (arguing that the fall of Enron was related to an overemphasis on
innate ability instead of performance).
92. See generally Ying-yi Hong, et al., Implicit Theories, Attributions, and
Coping: A Meaning System Approach, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 588
(1999) (connecting attribution theory to self-handicapping).
93. Subjects were given three statements, and asked to state their
agreement with each statement on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 6
(strongly disagree). The statements were: (1) “You have a certain amount of
intelligence and you really can’t do much to change it”; (2) “Your intelligence is
something about you that you can’t change very much”; and (3) “You can learn
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take a remedial course that was crucial to their academic success in
94
the social sciences.
Participants were finally divided into two
groups based on their previous high/low performance in the subject
95
matter.
Overall, previous high-performing students were uniformly
96
unlikely to be willing to take the remedial course. Poor performing
97
Those who believed in a
students, by contrast, were divided.
theory of malleable intelligence were more inclined to take the
98
course than those who believed in fixed intelligence.
A second experiment in this line connected theories of
intelligence to self-handicapping.
Experimenters first prepped
subjects to believe in a system of intelligence by reading a scholarly
article stating either that genetics or environment predicted
99
intelligence. Then, the subjects took a very hard IQ test. Half of
the subjects were then told they had done satisfactorily (at the sixtysixth percentile); half were told they were unsatisfactory (at the
100
twentieth percentile).
Subjects had a choice: did they want to practice for the next
round of testing? Most individuals exposed to the theory of
101
malleable intelligence chose to practice—around seventy percent.
However, those who were exposed to a fixed-intelligence framework
102
Only 13.3% of the subjects who had done poorly
divided sharply.
in the first round and believed that IQ is innate wanted to practice,
while two-thirds of the subjects who had done well wanted to
103
practice.

new things, but you can’t really change your basic intelligence.” Id. at 590.
Individuals with mean scores of 3.0 or lower were classified as “entity
theorists,” believing that intelligence is fixed, while those with scores of 4.0 or
above were classified as incremental theorists, believing that intelligence is not
fixed. Those with scores between 3.0 and 4.0 were indeterminate, and those
participants were eliminated from the study. Id. at 591.
94. Id. at 593. The course was English. The subjects were Hong Kong
university students. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. On an eleven-point scale, with zero being “certainly no” and ten
being “certainly yes,” the malleable-intelligence, low-performing students
averaged a 7.00; the fixed-intelligence, low-performing students averaged a
5.62. The comparable scores for high-performing students were 5.00 and 4.77, a
statistically insignificant difference. Id.
99. Id. at 594. Shockingly, it appears that simply reading one or the other
of these theories, and being tested on it as a “reading comprehension,” has
effects on individuals’ beliefs about the relationship between intelligence and
effort. Id. (surveying previous research). This result suggests that individuals’
theories of intelligence are not particularly robust.
100. Id. at 595.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 595–96.
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The Self-Handicapping of Corporate Managers

Theorists divide self-handicapping into behavioral and claimed
excuses. Behavioral self-handicapping is actually doing things that
make subsequent success less likely; claimed self-handicapping is
104
Claimed self-handicapping is
making excuses before the fact.
common: individuals claim anxiety, moods, hypochondria, or
shyness before being evaluated (whether or not actually suffering
105
Behavioral self-handicapping falls into fewer
such conditions).
categories: drug and alcohol abuse, setting unrealistic goals, and
106
reducing effort.
107
SelfExperiments examining effort are hard to design.
handicapping experiments work by making subjects feel upset and
helpless: loafing following such unpleasant experiences may not be
108
In one study working around
calculating, but instead restorative.
this problem, subjects were separated into two groups: (1) some were
told they were taking the Culture Fair Test of General Intelligence,
a good predictor of success in life; (2) others were told that they were
109
Subsets of
working on problems designed for a research class.
110
subjects were given easy sample problems, others hard ones.
111
Finally, before the “actual test” was to be administered,
experimenters distributed a questionnaire about the amount of
112
Subjects in the “A” group—
effort the subjects intended to exert.
those taking a test that would help to define their success in life and
who had experienced hard sample questions—reported that they
planned to exert significantly less effort on the second part of the
113
exam.
Experimenters searching for a theoretical connection between
self-handicapping and effort suggest that “a high level of effort
114
That
makes an ability attribution for failure all the more likely.”

104. Baumeister & Scher, supra note 72, at 8.
105. Id. (summarizing the literature).
106. Id.
107. An early work in this field is Arthur Frankel & Melvin L. Snyder, Poor
Performance Following Unsolvable Problems: Learned Helplessness or Egotism?,
36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1415 (1978).
108. Common examples are listening to music or watching television. Cf.
Tom Pyszczynski & Jeff Greenberg, Determinants of Reduction in Intended
Effort as a Strategy for Coping with Anticipated Failure, 17 J. RES. PERSONALITY
412, 413 (1983) (summarizing and criticizing earlier studies).
109. Id. at 415.
110. Id. at 415–16 (describing the method).
111. It never was. Subjects were instead debriefed after taking the
questionnaire. Id. at 416.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 416–17 (out of nine points, the hard-test subgroup reported that
they would, on average, exert a 7.30 in effort—the same as the subjects who
were not taking an important test at all—while the subjects exposed to easy
questions reported an intended effort of 8.55).
114. Id. at 420.
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is: the harder you try, the more likely that failure will be blamed on
your worth. So there is at least some theoretical basis for
understanding why corporate managers might shirk their duties
when the law punishes a corporate failure with personal liability.
This argument follows even though the actual likelihood of
punishment is low: managers, subject to risk aversion, may
overreact to low probability punishments that have extreme
115
consequences for their self-image. Such punishments will link the
executive’s ego and the corporation’s success ever more closely
together, resulting in the risk that failure will be attributed to the
manager. The tighter this link—the higher the expected costs of
negligence—the more executives may self-handicap.
Another very recent study focused directly on claimed manager
116
Siegel and
self-handicapping and its consequences for firms.
Brockner focused on the use, effectiveness, and market effects of
external and internal handicaps presented in the annual letters sent
by CEOs to shareholders as a part of the federal securities
117
External handicaps for these purposes were
disclosure regime.
obstacles outside the firm: “increased competition, economic
recession, or the rising prices of raw materials.” Internal handicaps,
by contrast, included: “restructuring, loss of personnel, and
operating challenges faced by particular product lines or areas of
118
business.”
In their first study, Siegel and Brockner asked business
students to act as investors in a fictitious firm, and provided the
students a 1995 President’s letter, financial information about the
firm’s competitors, the firm’s performance from 1991 to 1994, and
119
In one version of the
the firm’s “actual” performance for 1995.
letter, the CEO claimed external handicaps, in another, internal
120
Various scenarios
handicaps, and in a third, a mixed message.
manipulated the firm’s prior performance and subsequent

115. A newly articulated cultural status model provides a helpful theoretical
framework that explains why managers may fear the embarrassing prospect of
liability for shirking: risks that affect an individual’s place within a group
ranking are likely to be perceived as especially significant and odious. See Dan
M. Kahan et al., Gender, Race, and Risk Perception: The Influence of Cultural
Status Anxiety (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 86, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=723762.
116. Phyllis A. Siegel & Joel Brockner, Individual and Organizational
Consequences of CEO Claimed Handicapping: What’s Good For the CEO May
Not Be So Good for the Firm, 96 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 1 (2005).
117. Id. at 3, 6. Previous work had found that this letter was the “most
widely read part of the annual report,” and that there was “an association
between the information content of the President’s Letter and firm-specific
accounting and market-based performance measures.” Id. at 6.
118. Id. at 3.
119. Id. at 5–6.
120. Id. at 6–7.
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performance.
Students then undertook two tasks: they priced the
firm’s stock the day after the firm reported its 1995 financial results
and offered a recommended change to the CEO’s salary from its
122
1994 base.
The results of this experiment were surprising. External
handicaps influenced valuations of the firm and CEO compensation.
123
With
They reduced firm value in all performance conditions.
respect to CEO salary, when prior performance was negative,
124
external handicaps negatively affected the base salary, but when
the prior performance was good, external handicaps resulted in a six
125
percent net gain for the CEO’s recommended salary.
These findings led Siegel and Brockner to a market test: they
looked at a sample of publicly traded firms in 1994 and 1995, coding
126
Using an
each firm’s President’s Letters for handicapping traits.
event study analysis, Siegel and Brockner looked at the impact of
later earnings announcements on firm value and on CEO
127
compensation, specifically, the amount of the CEO’s bonus.
Holding all else equal, they found that external handicapping
correlated with a decrease in firm value, but internal handicaps did
128
By contrast, they did not fully replicate their experimental
not.
results for CEO compensation, although there was limited support
for the hypothesis that external handicaps tended to insulate CEOs
from market sanctions when their prior (good) performance was not
129
replicated. That is, self-handicapping by CEOs seems to serve the
130
classic goal of deflecting blame for failure. As Siegel and Brockner
point out, these
findings . . . raise a potential conundrum in that under some
conditions, an external claimed handicap that is favorable to
the CEO may be disadvantageous to the firm. . . . [W]hen
prior firm performance is good, the results . . . showed that
external claimed handicapping had a positive effect on CEO
121. Id. at 7.
122. Id. at 7–8 n.1 (noting that the study thus was looking to perceived
value, instead of investor behavior, but suggesting that investor predictions
should closely correlate with observed stock prices).
123. In the external handicapping conditions, the average stock price
predicted was $47.21; “in the absence of such handicaps, the average price was
$48.21.” There was no such effect for internal handicaps. Id. at 9.
124. Specifically, holding the handicap condition constant, subjects
recommended a 6.91% decrease in salary, but with the external handicap, the
recommended decrease was 7.35%. Id. at 10.
125. Id. (recommending a 4.90% increase instead of a 2.01% decrease)
126. Id. at 12.
127. Id. at 12–13.
128. Id. at 14.
129. Id. at 17. As Siegel and Brockner acknowledge, investor views and the
views of the boards of directors with respect to CEO compensation may be in
accord only rarely. Id.
130. Id. at 17–18.
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131

III.

HOW SHOULD THE LAW BEST PREVENT MANAGER NEGLIGENCE?

A.

Negligence and Self-Handicapping

Early in this Essay, I suggested that the doctrine of managerial
caretaking results in two puzzles. As I hope the reader will see, selfhandicapping sheds some light on both of these problems and
suggests reasons to doubt changes to the law that would increase
the expected sanctions associated with managerial negligence.
Essentially, self-handicapping theory undermines the idea that
more liability for managers’ shirking will result in more caretaking.
The opposite may be true. The theory also suggests reasons to think
that managers are more susceptive to this perverse incentive
problem than directors, because their success is so publicly linked to
that of the corporation.
In this Part, I support these conclusions in more detail. Before
doing so, I briefly observe that there are reasons to believe that
managerial liability for negligence will be ineffective apart from
those suggested by self-handicapping theory. If managers are in
truth rendered overconfident by corporate design, as Langevoort and
Paredes suggest, it is hard to imagine that they would refrain from
status-affirming activity (like entrepreneurship) simply because
they face the uncertain sanction of the duty of care. Only ten
132
percent of drivers think themselves worse than the average: what
percent of corporate executives would imagine they were grossly
negligent?
However, the optimism theory does not exclude the possibility
that a targeted liability regime might result in more care. In
Langevoort’s model, if we believed that managers were optimistic
but prone to negligence, we might increase the scope of the duty of
133
But
care when the company’s financial condition was in decline.
such dynamic sanction regimes seem, in this context, costly to
134
administer and easy to game.
Self-handicapping, by contrast, offers a more radical critique of
the application of tort law to corporate executives. Even a targeted
tort regime may increase, not decrease, negligence. To understand
why, consider that a duty of care claim is less likely to be brought
where the company’s shares have increased in value, because
131. Id. at 17.
132. Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 913, 929 (2000).
133. Thus, for example, the business judgment rule might only shield
decision making made in profit-making quarters!
134. Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of HyperCompetition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 968, 972–73 (2002).
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damages may be harder to prove. But a company’s share price is
highly variable: even managers who have successfully passed
through the gates of the tournament of selection will not necessarily
associate hard work with increased firm value. They will realize
that there are many factors in valuation—including many external
135
to the firm that the manager cannot control.
Facing this noncontingent success condition, the manager has
two defensive maneuvers close to hand. We have seen evidence of
the first: claiming external handicaps in disclosure documents, so as
to deflect blame from the manager’s performance. Such external
handicaps do reduce firm value, but they may increase the
136
Indeed, the ubiquity of cautionary
manager’s own compensation.
statements in securities disclosures, even before the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act’s (commonly known as PSLRA)
safe-harbor provision, is evidence of prevalence of the selfhandicapping among even confident corporate executives.
Managers may also begin to shirk. Recall the newly articulated
link between Enron and the duty of care. Professor DeMott relates
the story of Jeff McMahon, who succeeded Andrew Fastow as
137
Enron’s CFO. On joining the company:
McMahon . . . learned that Enron lacked any method with
which to track its cash and thereby determine just how much
cash the organisation had available to it at a particular
time. . . . Said McMahon, “That’s impossible! We’re a Fortune
50 company. We have to be tracking our cash.” A company
that did not track its cash was comparable to an individual
who failed to balance his or her checkbook. . . . “[A]pparently
Fastow had always thought that Enron would have more than
enough cash to spare”, and, given that assumption, neglected
138
to develop any cash-tracking systems.

This is a plausible account, and it supports DeMott’s defense of
a powerful new tort regime directed at managers. Enron’s officers
(like Fastow) had shirked their responsibilities—out of laziness and
disinterest—in favor of a focus on more interesting activities, like
139
According to this
the “creative use of special-purpose entities.”
traditional view, a real, damage-based remedy for failures of
managers’ duty of care may have prevented Enron’s fall.
However, this account of Fastow’s negligence misses an
important psychological component of his failure. Self-handicapping
theory suggests that Fastow would, in a sense, be happy about a
story that blamed his failures on laziness. Imagine a contrary story
135. See generally id. (discussing personality traits in highly competitive
organizations).
136. Siegel & Brockner, supra note 116, at 17.
137. DeMott, supra note 41, at 255.
138. Id. (internal citation omitted).
139. Id. at 255–56.
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about Fastow’s motivations, drawn from the same source:
140
Andy Fastow was an “incredibly insecure man.” A graduate of
Tufts and Northwestern Business School, Fastow had puffed his
141
Although he lacked the
resume to land his first job at Enron.
142
and was mocked within the
“knowledge” to be Enron’s CFO,
143
organization for his lack of business ability, he had risen rapidly
by virtue of his skill in manipulating financial instruments and
144
Apart from his
betting (successfully) on the rise in Enron’s stock.
expertise in manipulating financial earnings, Fastow was not
respected for his smarts: “He was a good average performer, but you
145
weren’t held in awe of his intellect,” said a former boss.
Surrounding Fastow were Ivy-Leaguers led by Jeff Skilling, who
146
Over time,
prioritized innate intelligence above all other traits.
Skilling came to rely on Fastow for increasingly dubious
transactions involving highly complex accounting treatment that
147
Driven by
Fastow may have lacked the skills to fully understand.
disloyalty and insecurity, Fastow increasingly shirked his
responsibility as a CFO, leaving the details of Enron’s global
financial position to others in favor of managing relationships with
148
bankers.
This account, too, is incomplete and potentially misleading—
149
However, it
Fastow’s negligence and disloyalty ran hand-in-hand.
140. BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM:
THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 139 (2003).
141. Id. at 134–37.
142. One insider suggests he could not “dissect a balance sheet.” Id. at 140.
143. He was known within Enron as “Andy Fast-Out” for having been
removed from a revenue-generating project after just nine months. Id. at 138–
39.
144. Id. at 132–70.
145. Id. at 136 (internal quotation omitted).
146. Id. at 31 (relating the story of Skilling’s interview with Harvard
Business School); id. at 55–56 (describing Enron’s meritocracy culture); id. at
63–64 (describing corruption of the performance system).
147. Id. at 155–61.
148. Id. at 163–65 (describing Fastow’s manipulations of lenders).
149. I recognize that there are some risks in engaging in a “clinical”
approach to the behavioral story of an enormously complicated event, like
Enron’s collapse. But, as Langevoort has pointed out:
Though risky because single observations will not always conform to
even the most well-established behavioral predictions, this exercise
has the virtue of presenting a richly defined situation as a reality
check. From a legal perspective, this exercise can be used to evaluate
that behavior—by understanding it better, we might become better
able to assess its blameworthiness, for example.
Donald C. Langevoort, Reflections on Scienter (and the Securities Fraud Case
Against Martha Stewart That Never Happened), 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 2
(2006). Moreover, as Jonathan Lipson, who read a draft of this Essay,
commented, Enron’s Special Purpose Entities were intended to generate cash,
suggesting that Fastow was concerned about cash-flow. The point of the
alternative storytelling above is not to suggest that Enron fell because Andy
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does capture a potential explanation for the lack of financial controls
at Enron. Enron’s sloppy bookkeeping may have resulted from Andy
Fastow’s self-handicapping strategy. Insecure about his intelligence
and faced with a task (managing Enron’s finances) that ultimately
depended for its success on the random walk of Enron’s stock price,
Fastow might have decided to shirk—to fail to act when a
reasonable manager would have—rather than have a later failure be
attributed to his lack of intelligence. This strategy has been partly
successful: we conventionally describe Andy Fastow as greedy and
150
criminal, but not foolish.
In short, managers who are grossly negligent may behave this
way as a method of self-protection, not merely because the law
insufficiently encourages their diligence.
Indeed, the selfhandicapping literature, when read as a whole, suggests that
increasing the legal sanctions for negligence will have perverse
effects: it might reinforce the link between executive ego and
corporate success, making executives more, not less, willing to
151
Considering the costs of imposing new legal duties on
shirk.
managers, we should consider whether other methods of control on
caretaking are available.
Finally, this potentially negative relationship between legal
sanctions and care sheds light on the persistent uncertainty of
Delaware law’s treatment of managerial duties. Commentators
have suggested that history and procedural accident explain the
152
But such
unresolved sources and scope of managers’ duty of care.
contingent explanations are not fully satisfying. Another possibility
is that the law recognizes the psychological differences between
managers and directors, and the possibility but not certainty, that
sanctions are self-defeating for managers. Uncertainty thus may
provide a more efficient liability regime than we would originally
have suspected.

Fastow was too insecure to manage the books, but to illustrate how a more
stringent care regime might have unintended and unfortunate consequences.
150. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 140, at 150–51.
151. The point that incentives may act in perverse ways is not unique to the
care problem. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law,
35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 211 (2006) (noting that certain types of “lazy or careless
decision making” will be unaffected (at best) by incentive structures).
152. For example, until recently, the Delaware Chancery Court lacked
jurisdiction over fiduciary suits against officers who were not directors. See
Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate
Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 905 (2003)
(noting “hole” in Delaware law). By statute, this “hole” was filled in 2004. DEL.
CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (Supp. 2006) (Revisor’s note stating that the act
became effective January 1, 2004). Such suits are also traditionally understood
as derivative, providing additional hurdles to recovery.
See Donald C.
Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and
Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1206–07 (2003).
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Ameliorating Self-Handicapping: Toward Rethinking Disney
153

Over the short term, self-handicapping feels good.
In sports,
for example, self-handicapping (like lack of practice) may enable
insecure players to enjoy physical activity instead of simply focusing
154
However, over time, studies have shown that
on wins and losses.
individuals who score high on measures of self-handicapping are
less healthy, confident, happy, and drug-free than those who self155
Self-handicappers fail more in their jobs and
handicap less.
156
education than those who do not.
In response, scholars have looked for ways to reduce the
tendency to self-handicap among groups or in situations where it is
157
This recently developing literature seems to have
common.
different strands: (1) changing how individuals think about
themselves; and (2) changing how individuals react to others’
158
impressions of them.
For example, some experiments report that simply reinforcing a
159
This works by
subject’s self-esteem reduces self-handicapping.
having subjects write about a value that they believe important to
them (e.g., religion) in a short essay before having the opportunity to
160
engage in self-handicapping behavior in a two-stage IQ test.
Doing so significantly reduced the likelihood that subjects would
161
self-handicap.
A second way to ameliorate self-handicapping is to change
individuals’ beliefs about how others will perceive their success and
failure. Preliminary work in this project has focused on grade
162
In a series of experiments, children praised for their
schoolers.
153. Zuckerman & Tsai, supra note 13, at 413 (summarizing literature on
short-term effects of self-handicapping).
154. Roberta K. Deppe & Judith M. Harackiewicz, Self-Handicapping and
Intrinsic Motivation: Buffering Intrinsic Motivation From the Threat of Failure,
70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 868, 872 (1996) (analyzing pinball playing).
155. Zuckerman & Tsai, supra note 13, at 431; cf. Deppe & Harackiewicz,
supra note 154, at 874 (suggesting that self-handicapping may reduce the entry
costs to difficult tasks and allow individuals to “build competence and gain
confidence” over time).
156. Raymond L. Higgins & Steven Berglas, The Maintenance and
Treatment of Self-Handicapping: From Risk-Taking to Face-Saving—and Back,
in SELF-HANDICAPPING, supra note 57, at 187, 195–214 (discussing self-defeating
self-handicaps); see also Zuckerman & Tsai, supra note 13, at 432 (reviewing
the literature).
157. See generally Self, supra note 83, at 37, 53–62 (describing inhibiting
factors).
158. Siegel et al., supra note 57, at 590. Another possibility is membership
on a team. Id.
159. Id. at 590–91.
160. Id. at 593.
161. Id. at 594.
162. Claudia M. Mueller & Carol S. Dweck, Praise for Intelligence Can
Undermine Children’s Motivation and Performance, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 33 (1998).

W07-HOFFMAN

826

9/17/2007 1:48:37 PM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

intelligence after taking a test did less well on subsequent tests,
enjoyed the experience less, and attributed failures to their innate
worth, while subjects praised for their effort on the first test worked
harder and did better, while attributing failure to lack of effort
163
That is, praise for intelligence seems to result
rather than worth.
in subjects believing that their performance is connected to their
innate smartness, and has pernicious consequences for future self164
handicapping.
The literature to date has not explored whether strategies like
these might work for corporate executives. Even if they did, the
challenges to reducing potential self-handicapping in such
individuals are many. First, and most significantly, we need more
research to determine when negligence by corporate executives may
legitimately be termed self-handicapping, instead of a failure of a
monitoring regime. Empirical work in this arena will be difficult to
design, although comparing identifiable markers of negligence, like
restatements of financial results, with different regimes of
caretaking across the states would be a place to start. Also, further
work on claimed self-handicapping in securities disclosures would
prove useful and enrich recent debates about the appropriateness of
165
the bespeaks-caution defense.
Second, to the extent that overconfidence is a structural aspect
of manager psychology, it might be hard to generate concern about a
psychological impediment that affects individuals with uncertain
self-confidence. However, this concern may be ameliorated by
noting the imprecision of all behavioral research and the commonsense observation that individuals who are exceedingly selfconfident in their public persona may be, in fact, quite uncertain
about their own skills.
Third, senior managers will have little patience for selfaffirmation sessions like those described above. Suggesting that
counseling will reduce managerial laziness is probably a
counterintuitive idea to individuals socialized to believe that
166
As Jeff Skilling
monetary incentives serve that precise function.
remarked: “This touchy-feely stuff isn’t as important as cash. That’s
167
what drives performance.”
Rather than focusing on managers, corporate jurists might
163. Id. at 48–49.
164. Id. at 50.
165. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” To Be a Rational Shareholder,
90 MINN. L. REV. 537, 587–88 (2006) (criticizing the bespeaks-action defense
from a behavioral perspective).
166. There is one extant study supporting this view. See Jeff Greenberg, et
al., Effect of Extrinsic Incentives on Use of Test Anxiety as an Anticipatory
Attributional Defense: Playing It Cool When the Stakes Are High, 47 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1136 (1984) (finding that financial stakes
ameliorated self-handicapping in certain circumstances).
167. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 140, at 55.
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consider a debiasing approach. As Professors Jolls and Sunstein
explain, debiasing is “intervening in and altering the situation that
produces the boundedly rational behavior,” instead of simply
168
In the
focusing on the “provision of financial incentives.”
corporate arena, debiasing is most often accomplished through
169
Similarly here,
changing the structure of board decision making.
the law could help companies to avoid handicapping managers by
optimizing executive selection.
Senior corporate executive personality tends to snowball
170
As the Enron example
throughout the organization.
demonstrates, a single executive with a strong focus on innate
intelligence can prove problematic for an entire company.
Therefore, well-run corporations should select against this character
trait and choose executives who believe that business acumen is a
learned, and flexible, trait. Similarly, executives could be tested
based on their tendency to self-handicap using the self-handicapping
171
Indeed, psychological
scale developed by Jones and Rhodewalt.
testing is an increasing part of the head-hunting process at major
corporations, although firms have traditionally selected managers
based on their political skills and ethical mindsets, and not these
172
more care-related characteristics.
The law could encourage selection of managers with an eye
toward self-handicapping. To do so, the law might hold directors
liable for hiring practices that do not (at least) consider an
executive’s potential tendency to be self-destructive. That is: the
law should continue to treat negligence as a gatekeeping problem,
173
Rather
but should be less hesitant to impose liability on boards.
than developing and enforcing substantive standards of care for
business-related activities, a subject far outside judicial core
competencies, courts would simply evaluate personnel decisions and
procedures.
The court in Disney obviously turned its back on such a

168. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 1511, at 211.
169. Id. at 219.
170. Randall S. Peterson et al., The Impact of Chief Executive Officer
Personality on Top Management Team Dynamics: One Mechanism by Which
Leadership Affects Organizational Performance, 88 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 795
(2003) (relating CEO personality to top management team dynamics using
archival sources and case studies).
171. See Frederick Rhodewalt, Self-Handicappers: Individual Differences in
the Preference for Anticipatory, Self-Protective Acts, in SELF-HANDICAPPING,
supra note 57, at 69, 77.
172. See Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 675, 677, 681
(C.D. Ill. 2004) (describing the practice of requiring managers to take a
personality test).
173. On gatekeeping, see Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role
For Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097 (2003)
(discussing the role of the corporate lawyer as gatekeeper).
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substantive examination of the board’s role in hiring.
It justly
feared creating new avenues for liability and reducing
175
But, ironically, in sanctioning negligent hiring,
entrepreneurship.
the court may have increased the pressure to monitor managers.
Jurists seeking a remedy for corporate wrongdoing have been forced
to look elsewhere: this very symposium is evidence that the renewed
effort to prevent corporate fraud may result in calls for managerial
liability.
There are some problems with my proposal, which render it, at
best, premature. For one, what if self-handicapping traits were
correlated with others that spark performance? A liability regime
might chill board innovation in hiring. Additionally, we should
perhaps resist a purely gatekeeping approach more generally: why
176
not simply punish shirking itself, rather than its potential?
Further, I do not mean to suggest that we can cure managerial
self-handicapping with a legal regime. This Essay’s ambitions are
decidedly more modest: (1) to introduce readers to the idea of selfhandicapping and to suggest its confounding relationship to an
effective care regime; and (2) to provide new ways to defend the
current (low-liability) stance of Delaware jurisprudence with respect
to managers.
An Essay with grander scope—one that was not cabined in by
length constraints or the author’s own demerits—might suggest that
the self-handicapping literature offers a challenge to tort law rules
outside of the corporate context. Law often purports to govern the
behavior of successful, confident individuals through tort
sanctions—attorney malpractice rules are another salient
177
If the duty of care will cause corporate executives to
example.
shirk when it hopes to create care, might it cause lawyers and other
professionals to do the same? This is a potentially deep question,
whose answer might unsettle some of our received wisdom about the
deterrent effect of liability regimes in a commonly reoccurring
context. But I do not purport to answer it here. After all, this was
just a Symposium Essay.

174. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 61 (Del. 2006).
175. See Justice Jack B. Jacobs, Remarks at the 2007 AALS Panel:
Dimensions of Disney, available at http://www3.cali.org/aals07/mp3/ (follow
“AALS 2007 Dimensions of Disney 20070103 PM.mp3” hyperlink).
176. Two reasons suggest themselves. Shirking, of course, is costly to
identify before it causes damage. Moreover, extensive monitoring regimes
reduce intra-organizational trust and cooperation.
177. See, e.g., Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should
Lawyers Change? A Critique of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by
Reference to Empirically-Derived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 547, 573–74 (1998) (commenting on the possibility of more or
different regulation of attorneys).

